manifest. Careful thought is necessary to make the risk as small as possible. If the system for verifying compliance with the treaty is too lax, national security is at the mercy of a potential violator. If too strict a system is insisted upon, the treaty may never be negotiated and the danger of the present arms race will continue and increase.
United States diplomats can negotiate a disarmament treaty most effectively if they keep in mind a final offer, a requirement for strictness of verification below which they will not go. The final offer must be one that strikes the best balance between the two risks RT, the risk under a treaty, and RN, the risk under no treaty. It appears that a, the United States negotiators' perception of the probability that a given final offer will be accepted by the Soviet Union, increases as strictness decreases. Hence RT, considered as a function of a, increases with a. The total risk R is
The best final offer is a requirement for strictness of verification minimizing R(a). 
